



**PIMA COUNTY ELECTION INTEGRITY COMMISSION  
MEETING MINUTES FOR AUGUST 19, 2016**  
<http://www.pima.gov/commission/ElectionIntegrity.shtml>

The Pima County Election Integrity Commission met in regular session on August 19, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. in the Herbert K. Abrams Building, 3rd Floor Conference Rooms 3108/3110 at 3950 S. Country Club Road, Tucson, Arizona.

**ITEM 1. ROLL CALL**

Present: Mary DeCamp, Bill Beard, Arnie Urken, Brian Bickel, Beth Borozan, Brad Nelson, Karen Schutte, Chris Cole and Barbara Tellman; Tom Ryan attended the meeting via phone conferencing; Jeff Rogers arrived at 9:30.

Also in Attendance: Ellen Wheeler, County Administrator's Office.

**ITEM 2. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE**

The American flag was saluted with the Pledge of Allegiance.

**ITEM 3. APPROVAL OF MINUTE SUMMARY – July 15, 2016**

It was moved by Brian Bickel, seconded by Arnie Urken and carried unanimously to approve the Minutes of the July 15, 2016 meeting.

**ITEM 4. CALL TO PUBLIC**

John Brakey gave the Commission his impressions of various election related issues and the "destruction" of ballot images.

Richard Hernandez gave the Commission his impressions of the function of the Election Integrity Commission.

Christina Cruz gave the Commission her impressions on images not being stored.

Jonathan Salvatierra gave the Commission his impressions on policy, procedure and following the law.

**ITEM 5. PROBLEMS WITH SECRETARY OF STATE'S WEBSITE – Barbara Tellman**

Tom wanted this on the Agenda because of the reports from the County IT Department, in case there were any comments or questions [copies of those reports are incorporated into these Minutes as Attachment 1, Recorder's Office, and Attachment 2, Elections Department].

Arnie suggested that either the counties' or Secretary of State's policies should be reviewed, because there was no discussion of what the problem was that caused the intrusion; perhaps it was a benign defect in the software used that allowed clever hackers with a way into the system. There was also nothing about "red team" testing. ES&S told them that they hire the same companies to test their systems for break-in that large defense contractors do. Arnie doesn't know if Pima County should be expected to do that, and maybe they should. Bill Beard added that the EIC should maybe make a recommendation to the Board of Supervisors to ask the Secretary of State to promulgate some statewide rules for handling the voter database information as well as any system that has that information on it. There need to be clear lines of authority responsible for ensuring that information is protected across the board. When Barbara asked if the *Procedures Manual* should address this, Bill responded that the *Manual* is part of it, but in many ways does not pertain to the issue of having access to the information in the voter database. Something needs to come from the Secretary of State that can be pushed down to the county level about how their database is managed and who has access to any system tied to the statewide database.

Related to the prior discussion and about red team testing, Tom suggested that Bill and Arnie put together some suggestions for discussion at the next meeting. The second aspect is the detection of changes or corruption to the database. He doesn't know what procedures or protocols are in place at the state or county levels to test the integrity of their own databases on a periodic basis. Perhaps they should ask Chris Roads and the State how they do that.

Barbara said this item will remain on the Agenda for the next meeting.

**ITEM 6. UPDATE ON AUGUST 30, 2016 PRIMARY ELECTION – Brad Nelson**

Brad said that approximately 266,000 early ballots had been mailed out by the Recorder's office; approximately 80,000 had been returned for verification, and approximately 56,000 are ready for tabulation. The official Logic and Accuracy Test was successfully conducted by the Arizona Secretary of State during the first week of August, and the political party Logic and Accuracy Board tested their individual decks on August 18<sup>th</sup>. The party L&A will be run immediately before tabulation of ballots begins, which is scheduled for August 24<sup>th</sup>. Sample ballots will begin arriving at voter households today; approximately 82,000 party-specific sample ballots and approximately 55,000 non-party affiliated sample ballots are being mailed. Poll worker training has begun and will run through next week. The requests for hand count auditors have been sent to the respective county party chairs; the hand count audit will take place September 3<sup>rd</sup>. The canvass of the Primary Election is tentatively scheduled for September 6<sup>th</sup>, assuming all provisional ballots are completed in an appropriate amount of time.

**ITEM 7. BALLOT HARVESTING ENFORCEMENT – Bill Beard**

Bill referred to an article on the subject of ballot harvesting [a copy of this article is incorporated into these Minutes as Attachment 3].

Bill's concern is that ballot harvesting is an issue for some people. He asked what procedures are in place for county election workers in the event that someone calls the police to say someone has come into a polling place and is stuffing the ballot box with early ballots? Have the Marshals and Inspectors been instructed to deal with it one way or another? Brad said that the law was passed but there is nothing procedurally to enforce the statute. In the absence of a uniform set of procedures, including in the *Procedures Manual*, there will be no enforcement at the polling locations. Bill asked again what would be done if someone from the public calls the police. Brad said that on occasion, he will get a call from a City of Tucson desk Sargent who says that officers have been dispatched to such and such a polling location. The Police Department is very sensitive about showing up at polling places, because law enforcement deters people from entering. Usually, they are called with regard to electioneering, and when they do show up they will get in and out just as fast as they can. When the Police Department calls Brad, he will then also call troubleshooters to go to the polling place, and then if available, Brad will go there, as well. But there will be no record made of anyone coming to the polling place with multiple ballots. He recognized that he has not given Bill much to go on in terms of enforcement of this law; however, Brad doesn't have much to go on, either, absent an actual procedure. Poll workers are being instructed to accept all ballots dropped off at the polling place.

Brian noted a rather humorous conundrum in that if you gather ballots and don't take them to the ballot box, it is a violation. If you gather ballots and take them to the ballot box, it is a violation. The law has exceptions—family members, care givers, etc.—but unless there is a return address on that yellow envelope, there is no way of determining whose ballot someone is actually dropping off at the polling place and whether it meets the exception criteria.

#### **ITEM 8. HERNANDEZ PETITION SIGNATURES – Chris Cole**

Brian Bickel asked if the Commission felt he should recuse himself from the meeting during this Item, since he had challenged the petitions of an opponent. The Commission had no problem with his staying.

Chris found out about this from a story in the *Arizona Daily Independent* [a copy of this June 23, 2016 article is incorporated into these Minutes as Attachment 4]. Chris spoke with Richard Hernandez, and he confirmed it.

The story is, when Richard Hernandez first took out his petitions, he was given a copy of the boundary lines for [Supervisor] District 2; it was an old map, not current. This was the basis for the challenge of a lot of the signatures on his petitions; the signatures were from people outside of District 2. Chris asked how a years-old map continued to stay in the system, and what can be done to prevent old maps from accidentally turning up again? Brad asked Chris what is the date of the old map? Chris does not know, but the closest he can come is that it was a map of the previous district boundaries. Barbara asked when the last time was that the boundaries had been changed; Brad responded that the Board of Supervisor boundaries changed after redistricting in 2011 and have not changed since then. Chris said that according to Mr. Hernandez, he got it from the Elections Department. Brad has looked at video and there is nothing showing him getting a map, nor is there any evidence in the receipt book that he bought one. Brian Bickel and Jeff Rogers both said they bought maps from the Elections Department; Brian bought his probably 18 months ago and the boundaries are correct to the extent that he knows they are correct on that map. Brian throws this caveat out: What is the responsibility of the candidate, and what is the responsibility of the Elections Department? If someone is going to run for public office, some of the responsibility is on them to verify to the extent possible that they are running within the correct boundaries.

Brad also added that he was present the entire time during the court hearing and Mr. Hernandez never asserted in court that he had received a bad map and that is why some of his signatures were invalid.

Mary DeCamp asked how soon after the re-precincting process maps become available; Brad responded that boards of supervisors have to establish their district lines by December 1 of the year prior to the even numbered year. They become effective March 1 of the even numbered year; map printing occurs during that intervening three-month period, and they are available when the new district lines take effect. Brad also noted that the Board of Supervisors lines have not changed since taking effect in 2012.

**ITEM 9. RISK LIMITING AUDIT PILOT STUDY – Tom Ryan / Brad Nelson**

- **Status on Elections Department Preparations for Mock Election**
- **Possible Dates for Mock Election**
- **Possible City Participation**

Tom asked Brad if anything had happened on this issue since the last meeting. Brad said they are still intending to do the mock election RLA in mid-December. A date has not been selected pending the possibility—although remote—of an election contest of the November 8 General Election. If that is the case, the system needs to remain pristine, without the introduction of an RLA.

Tom noted that the 29,700 ballots made for this mock election were marked by machine, and it is very likely all of them will be read perfectly, without error. He suggests that the remaining 300 blank ballots be marked by hand and use those to conduct a separate mock election. Brian suggested adding the 300 into the 29,700 also. Barbara suggested that some of the preprinted ballots could have overvotes added to them.

Jeff is still waiting to hear back from the City about their possible participation; he will follow up and report back at the next meeting.

Knowing that Tom might still be in Colorado, Brad asked him if there was anything in the news about RLA's in any of the counties there after their Primary Election the first Tuesday in August or thereabouts. Tom hadn't seen anything, but will check around.

**ITEM 10. ELECTION DATABASE STRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION – Tom Ryan**

Tom reported that David Wisely from the Elections Department had sent some files produced by the EMS for this mock election that are used to create the cast vote record. The cast vote record is critical for the election database distribution. Tom would like to suggest for the Primary Election that the cast vote record be "grabbed." He understands that requires keeping the ballot images, but he would like to see the cast vote records for this election. Tom Quigley also indicated to him that it is possible to produce the backup database as a CSV (comma separated value) file for each day of counting; that needs to be grabbed and distributed, also. Bill Beard asked Tom what his understanding of the timeframe for receiving this data is; Tom responded that it should be as quickly as possible, since the window for filing a challenge is within five days of the election. Brad responded that Pima County is trying to adhere to Judge Miller's previous order for release of materials, which Brad recalls being immediately after the canvass. He clarified that the challenge

period begins five days after the election canvass. Tom asked, since the cast vote record requires transfer of images from the scanners to the server, when can that transfer be done?

Tom asked how long the period for canvassing the election is; Brad responded that for the Primary Election he does not have much time because overseas ballots for the General must be produced; he must canvass at the county level no later than September 9<sup>th</sup>. Tom calculated that there are about two weeks between the date of the election and the canvass; what can be done to move images off the scanners and onto the server in that amount of time? There was discussion about locking everything up and running them overnight, which he has no objection to. Bill asked if that would violate party oversight responsibility and rules? Karen added that Elections Department personnel need to get into the servers immediately to start preparing for the General Election ballot; she knows they are concerned about getting it done in a timely manner. Tom responded that he is not trying to get in the way of procedures; but he does want to understand the actual method required for getting these documents ready for distribution.

Brian asked if the CSV files were discreet or cumulative; Brad responded they are cumulative. Brian noted that at the end, the cast vote record and the CSV file should match. Tom said the cast vote record should line up with the daily results. Bill asked if, given the time required for transferring images, which Karen said was approximately three to four hours per day in the past, the data can be made available to the parties for appropriate oversight. Brad would need to consult his IT employees to give a qualified answer to that question. Tom suggested that this be done for the Primary so that for future elections, they know how much time is involved. Karen added that this will change when the new software becomes available next year.

Barbara questions relating this to an election challenge since images have not been available for challenges in the past. Bill responded that the fundamental problem is that it is the ballot image that actually tabulates, not the ballot itself. He contends that by state law, the image must be preserved to do any auditing after the fact. Are we then knowingly walking into a lawsuit regarding a challenge? Barbara added that the Secretary of State has not been willing to clarify the status of ballot images and whether or not they are the same as paper ballots. Chris Cole thought this is important enough that the Board of Supervisors should be aware that regardless of what is done with ballot images, they will be breaking the law; Brian disagrees that they would be breaking the law. The ultimate authority is the paper ballot; if there is an election challenge, the paper ballots would be audited. The images only provide a mechanism for the system to tabulate results. Ballot images can't be used to conduct an audit, because we don't know the veracity of the ballot images. Bill responded that the cast vote record comes from the ballot images; there is a law that requires the County to provide that information in a timely manner. If a candidate goes to court to challenge the election, the judge will ask why Pima County has not provided that information. Bill further asked if the Commission is going to cause the County a problem because we have this information and haven't notified the Board of Supervisors they have a serious problem. Barbara noted that information provided to the parties in the past did not include information from ballot images. Bill replied that the system that we have now does not generate the cast vote record like the previous GEMS system. Brad said that on the GEMS system, depending on the complexity of the election, it would take a full eight hours to generate that information. Brian asked when the five-day window for an election challenge begins; Brad would say it begins as soon as the Board approves the canvass, because all results up to that action are unofficial. Brian then asked if images could be transferred between August 30 and September 6<sup>th</sup>. Once the Board canvasses the election, the cast vote record should be available to the political parties. Brad clarified that ballots are still being counted after August 30<sup>th</sup>.

Karen asked for clarification that the statutes require the cast vote record to be provided to the parties; Brad responded and Tom concurred, it is not statute, but Judge Miller's order.

Tom suggested making a recommendation that for the Primary Election, the CVR and daily databases be collected for distribution, not necessarily for distribution in a timely manner, but so we understand what it takes. Barbara said that, in speaking with Tom Quigley, preparing the election equipment for the General Election needs to be done within a very compressed timeframe. Brad added that the time they are up against is to get those overseas ballots out to individuals through UOCAVA and MOVE by September 16<sup>th</sup>, which is only ten days after the canvass.

Arnie asked Tom if the Commission should transmit any kind of warning to the Board about the potential problem of not being able to produce the cast vote record. Tom responded that it is a good idea. Arnie suggested Tom write it, since he is so knowledgeable on the subject. Members' suggestions to add into the letter:

- Brian: There is the potential for problems, as there would be anytime you change a system.  
Karen: ES&S has promised a software update to fix the problem.  
Barbara: Since there is no legal clarification of the status of images, we could be opening another can of worms by saving images.  
Bill: A head's-up should be sent prior to the Primary Election if at all possible.  
Brian: This correspondence should also be copied to the Secretary of State since they are certifying this equipment for use throughout the state.

Tom added that the issue of the database distribution is specific to Pima County, and not a statewide problem. The letter needs to be put together prior to the Primary Election, and there is not another meeting in between. Tom would need to write the letter and just send it without the rest of the Commission having the opportunity to review it. Tom's belief is that soliciting comments on a draft from the rest of the Commission might violate Open Meeting Laws.

#### **MOTION:**

Chris Cole made a motion to direct Chairman Tom Ryan to write a letter to the Board of Supervisors raising our concerns on the timely availability of the Cast Vote Record. Arnie seconded the motion.

#### **DISCUSSION:**

Tom asked if ballot images should also be discussed in the letter, since they are actually causing the problem of timeliness. The Commission concurred. Barbara clarified that this will be a letter of awareness, not asking for any action from the Board. Tom suggested that there could be one other Commission member that could review the letter; Barbara added that up to three members could do this without problems, so she suggested Bill and Arnie.

#### **VOTE:**

Barbara called for a vote; the motion was passed unanimously.

**ITEM 11. FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS**

Mary would like to discuss enlarging the electorate.  
Report on August 30, 2016 Primary  
Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Study – Mock Election  
Election Database Structure and Distribution

**ITEM 12. NEXT MEETING DATES**

September 16, 2016

**ITEM 13. ADJOURNMENT**

It was moved by Brian Bickel and seconded by Bill Beard and unanimously carried to adjourn the meeting. The meeting adjourned at approximately 10:35.



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# MEMORANDUM

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Date: July 26, 2016

To: The Honorable Chair and Members  
Pima County Board of Supervisors

From: C.H. Huckelberry  
County Administrator 

Re: **Security of Pima County's Voter Registration Database**

I previously communicated to the Board of Supervisors regarding the electronic security of computer systems associated with the Elections Department.

The attached report from the Information Technology Department describes the security systems associated with the Recorder's voter registration database.

This report was prepared due to the Secretary of State's voter registration system being hacked. County systems are as vigorous and secure as can be designed and implemented, and the County's system was not impacted by the Secretary of State's incident.

The attached report verifies the security of our local voter registration database and system.

CHH/anc

Attachment

c: The Honorable F. Ann Rodriguez Pima County Recorder  
Tom Burke, Deputy County Administrator for Administration  
Ellen Wheeler, Assistant County Administrator  
Chris Roads, Chief Deputy Recorder and Registrar of Voters  
Brad Nelson, Director, Elections Department  
Jesse Rodriguez, Director, Information Technology



## MEMORANDUM

Chuck H. Huckelberry  
County Administrator

From: ~~Dan~~ Dent  
Information Security Officer

Via: Jesse Rodriguez  
Chief Information Officer

Re: Vulnerability of Pima County's Voter Registration Database

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Per your memo to Jesse Rodriguez dated July 7, 2016, I visited the Pima County Recorder's office on July 20, 2016, to review their systems and ensure that County Recorder's databases were/are isolated from the Secretary of State's systems, and are not subject to hacking.

What I discovered while reviewing the thorough documentation that was provided along with a question and answer session with F. Ann Rodriguez and her staff, is that the Pima County Recorders staff have built an environment utilizing industry best practices, and have created an environment where they have very tight controls over all data entering and leaving their voter registration environment. The Help Americans Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 requires a single state voter database by Federal Law, so being totally separated from the Secretary of State voter database is not possible.

A portion of the funding received by the State of Arizona from HAVA was used to implement a voter registration system (VRAZ-1) that is utilized by 13 of the counties within the state as their only voter registration system. Shortly after VRAZ-1 went live, Pima and Maricopa Counties chose to continue to utilize their own voter registration/management systems, as giving up full control of voter data, which would have been required, was not an option either County was willing to pursue. Though Pima and Maricopa County Recorders pay a large portion of the annual maintenance costs of the current State system (VRAZ-2; voter registration and elections), all processing of voter registration data continues to be done on "in-house" systems.

Voter registration is currently done in one of two ways. A person either has to fill out voter registration paperwork at an Arizona Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) office (registration documentation within the system is annotated with an "M" for MVD) or submits the registration paperwork online through ServiceArizona.com (registration documentation within the system is annotated with an "I" for Internet). The MVD uploads the data that they process to the Secretary of State system(s). Voter registration data is then compared to the databases belonging to the Secretary of State who in turn compares it against existing MVD data to help determine the County in which the person should vote. The data is also compared against data from Arizona Proposition 200 (2004), the "Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, to ensure the person that is registering is a citizen, and if further discovery is necessary it is compared against other State/Federal databases.

A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is currently in place between the Secretary of State's datacenter and the Pima County Recorder's datacenter that is housed within the Pima County Recorder's facility at 6550 S. Country Club Road. The VPN connection mentioned connects the Secretary of State ZIA server in Phoenix to their ZIA server in Tucson. This connection is

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Via: Jesse Rodriguez, Chief Information Officer  
Re: Vulnerability of Pima County's Voter Registration Database  
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between Secretary of State purchased and managed equipment only and does not connect the Secretary of State system(s) directly into the Pima County system(s). I have physically reviewed the Recorder's datacenter and it is quite secure from a physical standpoint as cages have been constructed to keep it secure and separate from the rest of the Elections facility. There are also cameras throughout the facility that monitor all ingress, egress and internal traffic.

The Pima County Recorder voter registration system is fully owned and supported by the Recorder and is not directly connected with the State system. The Pima system is running on a Linux operating system running Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 256 ciphers which are approved for top secret data. The database(s) are built on the Oracle platform and are also running AES-256 ciphers, as well as running Oracle's Table Space Encryption also known as Transparent Data Encryption can be implemented for greater levels of performance and security. Oracle utilizes business rules and data analytics to determine if a file is in the correct format before it allows the data to be written into the production database. This process is in place to ensure there is no additional data (viruses/malware/malicious code) within a file that could cause problems for the system (numerical hash values of what the data should look like are in place and are compared against known good file values). TIF files that contain signatures are checked for viruses and malware before they are imported into the production environment and matched with their voter registration records. Every portion of the VRAZ system schema supports AES-256 encryption algorithm. The user connects to the VRAZ schema from the Secretary of State's Office has very restricted access to only staging data to pull and push the data from the SOS. This user cannot access other sensitive data across Pima County's Voter system.

The State ZIA server located in the Recorders datacenter pushes and pulls data from an "interface database" environment within the Recorders' environment (this is an intermediary environment and not the production system environment) utilizing "pollers" that are set to compare files to determine if there is new data that Pima County needs to consume into our system. Data from the interface database is then moved into shadow data tables within the production environment where a Recorder staff member reviews the data and determines its validity before it is placed into the production database tables. Reports are sent between the State and Pima County to provide full disclosure on the data that was sent so a comparison can be run to determine that nothing more and nothing less was received. The only fully automated process that isn't checked by a person is the movement of a voter from one county to another.

Based on the incident that transpired on the Secretary of State voter registration system, all VRAZ users were required to change their password. There are five (5) Pima County Recorder staff members that have accounts on the VRAZ system. Since the Pima County voter registration system is fully controlled by Pima County Recorder staff, the Pima system remained fully functional even though the State system was offline for 9 days.

The Secretary of State has expressed an interest in having the Pima County Recorder be their backup datacenter to house their VRAZ-2 backup system on several occasions. However, to date, no agreement has been made, and Pima County is not hosting the VRAZ-2 backup system.

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My findings are that that the Recorder is separated from the Secretary of State voter registration system, and that the Recorder has architected their voter registration system environment in a manner that it is protected from attacks. There is also no evidence that the incident that took place within the Secretary of State environment had any impact on the Pima County system. That being said, in the battle against cybercriminals, it isn't "IF" you will be hacked, it is "WHEN" you will be hacked. The checks and balances the Recorder has in place for data entering and leaving their systems are very valuable to knowing if there is an attack and being able to deal with that attack in a timely manner.

DH/mk

C: Tom Burke, Deputy County Administrator for Administration



## MEMORANDUM

Date: July 15, 2016

To: Chuck H. Huckelberry  
County AdministratorFrom: Dan ~~Funt~~  
Information Security OfficerVia: Jesse Rodriguez  
Chief Information Officer

Re: Vulnerability of Pima County's Voter Registration Database

In response to your memo dated July 7, 2016, Matt Osmond and I visited the Pima County Elections facility on July 12, 2016, to review their systems and ensure that County Elections databases were/are isolated from the Secretary of State's systems, and are not subject to hacking. Before going on site, I reviewed several sections from Arizona Revised Statute having to do with Elections tabulation system security (ARS § 16-442, ARS § 16-444, ARS § 16-445, ARS § 16-624, and ARS § 16-1004) that were provided to me by Mr. Nelson.

What we found through visual inspection and a question and answer session with Thomas Quigley, Elections Technician, Senior, is that Pima County Elections staff are doing everything they can to ensure they are following Arizona Revised Statute regarding the Elections tabulation system security, and it appears they have gone above and beyond in most areas. We found a system that is "air-gapped" (no physical connectivity) from the Pima County network and has no connectivity to the Internet. Because of that, there is no way the Pima County system can be connected to the Secretary of State systems, and the risk of anyone hacking into it without having physical access to the facility is next to impossible. There are cameras throughout the facility recording the movement of people into, out of and throughout the facility. We were required to sign in at the front desk and then again in the room where the elections tabulation system resides.

The Elections Office operates:

- Six (6) DS 850 High-Speed Scanner & Tabulators from Election Systems and Software (ES&S) which are fully United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) certified. During an election these devices are unplugged from the "closed network" at the end of each day and the data is wiped off of them. These machines locally store the data as they are tabulating election results and transfer that data to the server(s).
- There are two (2) Dell PowerEdge R620 servers on the system, the second being in place for redundancy in case the first one fails. These servers run on a Microsoft Windows server operating system. ES&S, who is an Arizona State certified elections vendor is responsible for "building" the servers and making sure they have everything on them that is necessary for the elections tabulation system to function. The server/system is then certified and absolutely no changes can be made to it. No Windows updates, antivirus updates or applications updates are applied to the system once it has been certified. The server(s) are also unplugged from the network except during the

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processing of Election results as one more layer of protection against hacking or theft of data.

- The scanner/tabulators and servers are connected to/through a Cisco Catalyst 2960 switch that resides within a locked cabinet where the locking mechanisms are covered with a seal so it is evident if the locking mechanisms are ever opened. The seals are numbered and their placement throughout the system are logged as to when they were put on, by whom, who witnessed the placement, and the reason the seal was broken in the first place. All devices are connected to the switch via Ethernet cables that are color coded by device. The cabling runs overhead in wire basket cable trays which make it very easy to trace the cables from point of origin through point of termination, and makes it easy to see there were no "additional" cables available that would allow the system to be plugged into a network that would give it accessibility to the County network or Internet.
- Election data is then backed up from the server onto a memory stick and stored in a locked fireproof safe.
- Election results are gathered from the server(s) via CD and provided to the State/designee via secure email or utilizing secure file transfer protocol (SFTP) to place the data on a server.
- There is a single analog phone line within the room that has no ability to provide connectivity into the air-gapped system.

We have not been able to meet with the Recorder as she has been on vacation and just returned this week. She has asked that we give her a few days to catch up and we will then meet and determine what the state of security is for her systems.

DH/mk

Copy: The Honorable F. Ann Rodriguez, Pima County Recorder  
Tom Burke, Deputy County Administrator for Administration  
Brad Nelson, Director, Elections Department



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# MEMORANDUM

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Date: July 7, 2016

To: Jesse Rodriguez, Director  
Information Technology Department

From: C.H. Huckelberry  
County Administrator 

Re: **Vulnerability of Pima County's Voter Registration Database**

I understand the State of Arizona Voter Registration Database has been breached. Please see the attached June 30, 2016 *Republic* article. This database is housed on the Secretary of State's computer systems and platforms. The County's databases are housed locally.

I would appreciate your review to ensure our Election Department and Voter Registration databases remain isolated from those of the Secretary of State's systems and are not subject to hacking. Based on the information I received, I believe the Federal Bureau of Investigation has informed the Arizona Department of Administration of the hacking and/or intrusion into the Secretary of State's Voter Registration Database.

CHH/anc

Attachment

c: The Honorable F. Ann Rodriguez, Pima County Recorder  
Tom Burke, Deputy County Administrator for Administration  
Brad Nelson, Director, Elections Department

FBI concerns shut down parts of secretary of state's elections site

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## FBI concerns shut down parts of secretary of state's elections site

 Mary Jo Pitzel, The Republic | azcentral.com 3:09 p.m. MST June 30, 2016

*Security concerns prompt the Arizona Secretary of State's Office to shut down parts of its website that affect candidates running with public financing and voter registration.*



(Photo: Denny Miller/The Republic)

### UPDATE:

*The FBI found a potential threat to the state's voter-registration system, which is why the Arizona Secretary of State's Office still has parts of its system shut down.*

*The problem apparently stems from a "compromised" credential that someone using a Gila County computer used to log in to the state's Voter Registration System, the state Department of Administration said in a statement. A secretary of state investigation found the affected computer had malicious software on it, DOA said.*

*DOA's cyber response team said it is working with the FBI and the Secretary of State's Office to fix the system and get it back online.*

Parts of the Arizona secretary of state's website are down for unspecified security-related maintenance, angering some candidate campaigns that received belated notice.

The portion of the site dealing with online contributions to the public campaign-finance system was shut down Tuesday evening, said Matt Roberts, a spokesman for Secretary of State Michele Reagan.

But it was only Wednesday morning that the office sent a notice to the Clean Elections candidates using the site's online service for gathering the \$5 contributions necessary to qualify for public financing.

"Why wouldn't you notify the candidates first?" asked Chad Campbell, a consultant for the campaign of Corporation Commission candidates Tom Chabin and Bill Mundell.


The two Democrats launched a digital campaign late Tuesday afternoon, seeking the \$5 donations. But apparently, any would-be donors could not contribute due to the site's shutdown, something Campbell said the campaign only learned when a donor contacted them.

A formal notice from the Secretary of State's Office to the 53 affected candidates went out just before 10 a.m. Wednesday, soon after Campbell started complaining about it on Twitter.

Constantin Querard, who runs campaigns for a number of Republican candidates who use the public campaign-finance system, said he had not heard any complaints from his clients.

## FBI concerns shut down parts of secretary of state's elections site

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So, @SecretaryReagan, any idea when the E-qual site will be back up and running again?

7:55 AM - 29 Jun 2016

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Portions of the website were shut down late Tuesday when the state Department of Administration, which oversees the state's computer and technology systems, shared security-related information with her office. [Reagan wrote in a blog on her website \(http://www.azsos.gov/about-office/media-center/azsosblog/948\)](http://www.azsos.gov/about-office/media-center/azsosblog/948). The site hopefully will be restored by the weekend, she wrote.

Her office would not provide any further detail on the nature of the security concern.

Although the voter-registration system is down, Roberts said anyone who registers to vote in the coming days will have their information electronically queued, and it will be recorded when the system is restored. Likewise, any registrations filed via paper will be added to the system when it is back up and running.

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# Maricopa County poll workers won't enforce new ballot-harvesting law

 [Rebekah L. Sanders](#), The Republic | azcentral.com 5:07 p.m. MST August 10, 2016

## Story Highlights

- The law bans anyone except family members, household members and caregivers from dropping off another person's ballot
- The new law provides no clear direction about enforcement

Maricopa County Recorder Helen Purcell will not enforce a new election law in the Aug. 30 primary, disappointing Republicans who say it's necessary to prevent voter fraud.

The law prohibits anyone in Arizona — except family members, household members and caregivers — from delivering another person's ballot to a polling place or election site.

Community groups, largely Democratic but some GOP, have collected ballots from voters in the past and delivered them in bulk, often after it's too late for voters to mail their ballots before Election Day or when voters cannot make it to the polls themselves. Opponents of the practice say it provides an opportunity for voter fraud, although there is no evidence it has occurred.

## New law unclear on enforcement at the polls

The new law, signed by Gov. Doug Ducey in March, provides no clear direction about enforcement, and county elections officials apparently have received no formal guidance from state, legislative or party leaders. A lawsuit challenging the statute is ongoing.

Purcell, a Republican, said Maricopa County election workers will accept any ballots delivered to polling places and early-voting sites, including city clerk offices.

"If somebody brings in ballots, there's a box there for them to put the ballots in. We're going to process that ballot just like we do anything else," Purcell said. "We are not the police."

*The Arizona Republic* asked state, county and political officials how enforcement should be done.

The law's author, state Rep. Michelle Ugenti-Rita, R-Scottsdale, refused to answer.

"I'm not going to go on the record about (Purcell's) particular comments," she said.

Hunter Overstreet, a spokesman for Arizona Secretary of State Michele Reagan, who oversees elections across the state, said the law is largely meant as a deterrent.

But poll observers could make reports to police and county attorneys, by recording cellphone video or obtaining security-camera footage of a person they suspect of delivering other people's ballots, Overstreet said.

"We generally agree with Ms. Purcell's statement," he said in an email. "It is up to the police and county attorney to enforce criminal statutes not election officials. ... State law allows political parties to have observers monitor the conduct of the election. While these observers cannot use their cell cameras inside a polling place their presence is another deterrent to someone turning in a shopping cart full of ballots."

### **Groups to offer guidance for poll observers**

Walt Opaska, a member of the Arizona Republican Lawyers Association, said the group is developing guidance for poll observers on what to look for.

But he doesn't envision them calling police to arrest someone.

"No, we would just report it," Opaska said.

He agreed election officials should accept ballots, even if they are dropped off in bulk. But Opaska said he is disappointed Purcell does not plan any level of enforcement, such as asking people who drop off multiple ballots for their names and contact information or notifying authorities of the activity.

Arizona Republican Party spokesman Tim Sifert said the lawyers' association will operate a hotline on Election Day to take questions and reports from poll observers.

"The volunteers are the eyes and ears," he said. "This is just one more thing that gets added to the list of things that are out of the ordinary that could potentially happen."

Rebecca Wilder, a spokeswoman for Maricopa County Attorney Bill Montgomery, said police would need to investigate a report before prosecutors take action.

"We would need a submittal from a law enforcement agency, meaning an alleged violation would have been investigated, before we see it," she said in an email. "Once a submittal is received, we would handle it as we would any other submittal."



## Pima Democrats Crush LGBT Independent Valadez Challenger Hernandez



BY: ADI NEWS SERVICES JUNE 23, 2016



This week, the Democratic machine crushed the hopes of independent members of the LGBT community when they successfully blocked activist Richard Hernandez from appearing on the ballot for a seat on the Pima County Board of Supervisors. Pima County Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Bergin ruled that Hernandez was seven nominating signature short based on a technicality.

Hernandez needed 810 valid signatures. He gathered 1,056. The democrats, through Cathy Kennedy and their attorney, Vince Rabago, challenged 312. The Court determined that 274 were from invalid electors.

The judge found that one ailing friend, Ms. Diana Araiza, had not signed the back of the petitions she had circulated. As a result 24 signatures were invalidated. The signatures were invalidated based on the fact that while she and Hernandez circulated the petitions at her birthday party, it was he and not her who signed the petitions.

According to Hernandez, Pima County gave him a map of the boundaries this year in which he could gather signatures. He proceeded to gather signatures based on that map. However in court a handful of signatures were invalidated because the boundaries had changed during redistricting. No explanation was provided as to why was given an out-of-date map.

Hernandez said he is contemplating an appeal, but he recognizes that the Pima powers-that-be will make any challenge to the status quo whether in court or on the campaign trail nearly impossible.

The requirements for getting on the ballot are designed to benefit the parties: democrats need 147 signatures, republicans need 108, libertarians need 69, and greens need 20. Independent candidates need 810.

